

# **A SMOOTH SEA NEVER MADE A SKILLED PHISHERMAN**

**DEEP DIVE INTO THE EVER-EVOLVING  
WORLD OF PHISHING**

Kuba Gretzky



@mrgretzky

# 00 // WHOAMI

## KUBA GRETZKY

Offensive Security Tools Developer

Ex-MMO Game Hacker

**breakdev.org** - offensive security blog

**EVILGINX** + **EVILGINX PRO** (coming soon)

**pwndrop** - dropbox for red teams

**BREAKDEV RED** - community for red teamers

**Evilginx Mastery** - phishing with Evilginx 101



@mrgretzky




# 00 // WHOAMI

## IT STARTED @X33FCON

Lunchtime WiFi Hacking (7 years ago) 2017

Thank you

- Evilginx – <http://bit.ly/evilginx>
- Email: [kuba@breakdev.org](mailto:kuba@breakdev.org)



# 01 // INTRO

## WHAT IS THE TALK ABOUT?

- Defences against phishing are evolving
- Phishing is getting harder
- Black market phishing toolkits keep evolving
- Red teamers left alone in the dark with open-source tools

# HELP?





**evilginx**pro

# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

- Bad guys like phishing
- Bad guys like free tools
- Red teams need to simulate bad guys
- Red teams need better tools
- Bad guys should not have better tools



**BREAKDEV RED**



**BREAKDEV**

# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### CLIENT-SERVER ARCHITECTURE

- Evilginx server deployed as a daemon
- Evilginx client able to deploy servers and connect to them
- No need to SSH to each server
- Multi-user collaboration on servers
- Admin API carefully hidden behind HTTPS port 443
- Easy server deployment with several commands:

```
servers add evilx33f 1.2.3.4  
servers register evilx33f  
servers deploy evilx33f
```



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### CLIENT-SERVER ARCHITECTURE

- Evilginx API accessible via HTTPS requests or a persistent WebSockets connection:

```
1 {
2   "status": "ok",
3   "message": "",
4   "command": "sessions",
5   "data": {
6     "mode": "list",
7     "sessions": [
8       {
9         "id": 6,
10        "session_id": "833733b7-4b05-436d-aa0c-46a8212bc86a",
11        "phishlet": "google",
12        "username": [REDACTED],
13        "password": [REDACTED],
14        "landing_url": "https://accounts.google.fake.com/wKfhHahG",
15        "user_agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
16        Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 Safari/537.36",
17        "origin": "127.0.0.1",
18        "create_time": 1705169076,
19        "update_time": 1705169121,
20        "tokens": {
21          "cookies": [
```





# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### EVILPUPPET

- Background browser controllable with phishlets
- Extraction of shadow tokens in real-time

```
1 evilpuppet:
2   triggers:
3     - domains: ['www.linkedin.com']
4       paths: ['/checkpoint/lg/login-submit']
5       token: 'apfc'
6       open_url: 'https://www.linkedin.com/login'
7       actions:
8         - selector: '#username'
9           value: '{username}'
10          enter: false
11          click: false
12          post_wait: 500
13        - selector: '#password'
14          value: '{password}'
15          enter: false
16          click: false
17          post_wait: 500
18        - selector: 'button[type=submit]'
```



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### REVERSE PROXY AS A WEBSITE SPOOFER

- Display external websites in the context of the phishing domain
- Unauthorized clients will see a legitimate website under a phishing URL



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### TLS WILDCARD CERTIFICATES

- Automated retrieval and renewal
- Prevents exposing your phishing hostnames through TLS Transparency Log
- Scanners see TLS certificates registered for `*.phish.com` instead of `your.phish.com`



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### AUTOMATED JAVASCRIPT OBFUSCATION

- Auto-obfuscation for all injected scripts with **obfuscator.io** engine

```
1 (function(_0x1e05dc,_0x208ad4){var
  _0x436649=_0x2ca9,_0x155dfb=_0x1e05dc();while(!![]){try{var _0x2f832c=-
  parseInt(_0x436649(0x181))/0x1+parseInt(_0x436649(0x183))/0x2*(-
  parseInt(_0x436649(0x184))/0x3)+-parseInt(_0x436649(0x186))/0x4+-
  parseInt(_0x436649(0x187))/0x5+-parseInt(_0x436649(0x180))/0x6+-
  parseInt(_0x436649(0x182))/0x7*(-
  parseInt(_0x436649(0x17e))/0x8)+parseInt(_0x436649(0x17f))/0x9;if(_0x2f832
  c===_0x208ad4)break;else _0x155dfb['push'](_0x155dfb['shift']
  ());}catch(_0x542cd7){_0x155dfb['push'](_0x155dfb['shift']());}}
  (_0x3ecd,0xd69e1));function _0x2ca9(_0x3870af,_0xae0a46){var
  _0x3ecd1f=_0x3ecd();return _0x2ca9=function(_0x2ca948,_0x5e649f)
  {_0x2ca948=_0x2ca948-0x17e;var _0x2593b1=_0x3ecd1f[_0x2ca948];return
  _0x2593b1;},_0x2ca9(_0x3870af,_0xae0a46);}function hi(){var
  _0x86f3ba=_0x2ca9;console[_0x86f3ba(0x185)]
  ('I\x20<3\x20Evilginx');}function _0x3ecd(){var _0x526cb7=
  ['7013435NYJwOd','2481392SSpqkU','48156795eBkbpq','9789024TiKfKM','378423R
  DYQeT','14sbxCAG','2uGspka','3185043dQacAj','log','2470940hKdiuJ'];_0x3ecd
  =function(){return _0x526cb7;};return _0x3ecd();}hi();}
```



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### SQLITE DATABASE

- BuntDB no more
- Sorry, Melvin!

Bobber: <https://github.com/Flangvik/Bobber>

The TriForce of Initial Access:

<https://trustedsec.com/blog/the-triforce-of-initial-access>



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### EXTERNAL DNS MANAGEMENT

- Multiple domains support
- DNS zones controlled through external nameservers
  - Cloudflare
  - Digital Ocean
  - Route 53 (AWS)
- Plug & play different providers using **libdns** interface:  
<https://github.com/libdns/libdns>



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### JA4 SIGNATURE SPOOFING

- Spoofing the outbound TLS connection fingerprint



# 03 // JA4 SPOOFING

## DESCRIPTION

*“ JA4+ is a suite of network fingerprinting methods that are easy to use and easy to share. These methods are both human and machine readable to facilitate more effective threat-hunting and analysis.*

- Created by **John Althouse** from **Fox-IO**
- Successor to JA3
- Signature generated from TLS handshake Client Hello packet

<https://blog.foxio.io/ja4+-network-fingerprinting>

<https://github.com/FoxIO-LLC/ja4>





# 03 // JA4 SPOOFING


## CLIENT HELLO

- Maximum supported TLS version
- ALPN (HTTP/2 or QUIC supported?)
- Supported cipher suites
- List of TLS extensions



# 03 // JA4 SPOOFING

## JA4: TLS Client Fingerprint



- Truncated SHA256 hash of the Cipher Suites, sorted
- Truncated SHA256 hash of the Extensions, sorted  
+ Signature Algorithms, in the order they appear

▼ Transport Layer Security

▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Content Type: Handshake (22)

Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

Length: 1989

▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)

Length: 1985

Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)

▶ Random: 23ed7af65e30c3b4fc5dfa79bdfd1d1b4936abdc52fa0e1b3215cb7e92a0c35

Session ID Length: 32

Session ID: 00ee8edb84cb532e95daa9f683c7cef7078bfad717101a8e5eedb004dfc992e3

Cipher Suites Length: 32

▶ Cipher Suites (16 suites)

Compression Methods Length: 1

▶ Compression Methods (1 method)

Extensions Length: 1880

▶ Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)

▶ Extension: server\_name (len=17) name=breakdev.org

▶ Extension: supported\_groups (len=12)

▶ Extension: supported\_versions (len=7) TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2

▶ Extension: psk\_key\_exchange\_modes (len=2)

▶ Extension: application\_layer\_protocol\_negotiation (len=14)

▶ Extension: ec\_point\_formats (len=2)

▶ Extension: application\_settings (len=5)

▶ Extension: compress\_certificate (len=3)

▶ Extension: session\_ticket (len=208)

▶ Extension: signature\_algorithms (len=18)

▶ Extension: extended\_master\_secret (len=0)

▶ Extension: renegotiation\_info (len=1)

▶ Extension: key\_share (len=1263) X25519Kyber768Draft00, x25519

▶ Extension: encrypted\_client\_hello (len=250)

▶ Extension: signed\_certificate\_timestamp (len=0)

▶ Extension: status\_request (len=5)

▶ Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=1)

[JA4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862]

[JA4\_r: t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b]

[JA3 Fullstring: 771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,0-10-43-44]

[JA3: 5b786b79b935d4e93b450c2a80ca86ef]

▼ JA4 Fingerprint

JA4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862

JA4 Raw: t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b,

JA4 Raw (Original): t13d1516h2\_1301,1302,1303,c02b,c02f,c02c,c030,cca9,cca8,c013,c014,009c,009d,002f,0035\_000a,

Transport Layer Security

▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

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Session ID Length: 32

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[JA3 Fullstring: 771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,0-10-43-44]

[JA3: 5b786b79b935d4e93b450c2a80ca86ef]

▼ JA4 Fingerprint

JA4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862

JA4 Raw: t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b,

JA4 Raw (Original): t13d1516h2\_1301,1302,1303,c02b,c02f,c02c,c030,cca9,cca8,c013,c014,009c,009d,002f,0035\_000a,

**Cipher suites (JA4\_B)**

Transport Layer Security

▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Content Type: Handshake (22)

Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

Length: 1989

▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)

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▶ Extension: encrypted\_client\_hello (len=250)

▶ Extension: signed\_certificate\_timestamp (len=0)

▶ Extension: status\_request (len=5)

▶ Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=1)

[JA4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862]

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[JA3 Fullstring: 771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,0-10-43-44]

[JA3: 5b786b79b935d4e93b450c2a80ca86ef]

▼ JA4 Fingerprint

JA4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862

JA4 Raw: t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b,

JA4 Raw (Original): t13d1516h2\_1301,1302,1303,c02b,c02f,c02c,c030,cca9,cca8,c013,c014,009c,009d,002f,0035\_000a,

**Cipher suites (JA4\_B)**

**TLS Extensions (JA4\_C)**

```
▼ Transport Layer Security
  ▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
    Content Type: Handshake (22)
    Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
    Length: 1989
    ▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
      Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
      Length: 1985
      Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
      ▶ Random: 23ed7af65e30c3b4fc5dfa79bdfd1d1b4936abdc52fa0e1b3215cb7e92a0c35
      Session ID Length: 32
      Session ID: 00ee8edb84cb532e95daa9f683c7cef7078bfad717101a8e5eedb004dfc992e3
      Cipher Suites Length: 32
      ▼ Cipher Suites (16 suites)
        Cipher Suite: Reserved (GREASE) (0x8a8a)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x1301)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x1302)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0x1303)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc02c)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcca9)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcca8)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009c)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009d)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)
        Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0035)
      Compression Methods Length: 1
      ▶ Compression Methods (1 method)
      Extensions Length: 1880
```

**Cipher suites**



# 03 // JA4 SPOOFING

## SIGNATURE GENERATION

**JA4:**

**t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862**

**JA4 Raw:**

**t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013  
,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b  
,000d,0012,0017,001b,0023,002b,002d,0033,4469,fe0d  
,ff01\_0403,0804,0401,0503,0805,0501,0806,0601**





# 04 // THE HUNT FOR EVILGINX

## SCOUTING FOR PREY

Application	JA4
Google Chrome	t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_02713d6af862 (TCP) q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_06cda9e17597 (QUIC)
Mozilla Firefox	t13d1715h2_5b57614c22b0_7121afd63204
Safari	t13d2014h2_a09f3c656075_14788d8d241b
IcedID Malware	t13d201100_2b729b4bf6f3_9e7b989ebec8
Sliver Malware	t13d190900_9dc949149365_97f8aa674fd9
SoftEther VPN	t13d880900_fcb5b95cb75a_b0d3b4ac2a14
Evilginx	t13d191000_9dc949149365_e7c285222651





# 04 // THE HUNT FOR EVILGINX

## SCOUTING FOR PREY

Common **JA4\_B** signatures:

- Google Chrome: **8daaf6152771**
- Golang (Sliver, Evilginx): **9dc949149365**

Cloudflare uses JA3/JA4:

<https://developers.cloudflare.com/bots/concepts/ja3-ja4-fingerprint/>



# 04 // THE HUNT FOR EVILGINX

## WHAT CAN BE DONE?

### SPOOF TLS CLIENT CONFIG

- Modify the list of supported TLS ciphers
- Use random TLS configurations with uTLS library:  
<https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls>
  - Different JA4 signature with every TLS connection
  - Good to avoid JA4 blacklists
  - Enough until defenders deploy more advanced detections
- Copy TLS configuration directly from client connecting to the proxy




What if we could harness the power of JA4 and  
use it to our advantage?


And make...

**THE HUNTERS  
BECOME  
THE HUNTED**


**LOOK AT ME**



**LOOK AT ME**



**I AM THE DEFENDER NOW**



**WELL, WELL, WELL,  
HOW THE TURNTABLES...**

# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## THE WHEEL REINVENTED

- Cloudflare is already great at it
- Cloudflare Turnstile as Evilginx redirector:  
<https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2/blob/master/redirectors/turnstile/index.html>
- Why not implement our own botguard?

**BEHOLD**

**POOR MAN'S CLOUDFLARE**



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## PREPARATIONS

- Forked **go-vhost** library used to extract hostnames from the TLS ClientHello packet's SNI extension data  
<https://github.com/inconshreveable/go-vhost>
- Added code to generate JA4 signatures for every connection
- Set up database logging of JA4 and User-Agent for every unauthorized request
- Disabled usage of wildcard certificates to trigger as many scans as possible
- Uploaded the phishing link to any URL scanning service I could find
- I gathered data for one month





# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## RESULTS

- 820 requests
- 680 unique IPs (IP blacklisting is dead)
- 52 different ASNs (database available for free on [IPinfo.io](https://ipinfo.io))
- Most popular **JA4\_B** signatures:

JA4_B	Name	Count	Percentage
8daaf6152771	Google Chrome	650	80%
9dc949149365	Golang	90	11%
e8a523a41297	Googlebot	10	1%

# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## RESULTS

- Partial failure
- JA4 signatures are not enough to detect bots
- Most bots use the Chromium engine (headless browsers)



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## NEW IDEA

- Phished users must have JavaScript enabled
- Safe to assume JavaScript will always be available
- How many bots are able to run JavaScript?



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## GATHERING BROWSER TELEMETRY

- JavaScript injected into the landing page (the reverse proxied spoofed page) to gather browser telemetry
- Telemetry sent back to the Evilginx server for analysis
- If authorized, Evilginx redirects to the phishing page

**Q:** How many page views out of **820** resulted in telemetry data being sent back to the Evilginx server?

**A:** ~**35** 🤔

Fp-Collect: <https://github.com/antoinevassel/fp-collect>



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## ANALYZING BROWSER TELEMETRY

- Decided to go for the low-hanging fruit:
  - Browser window size
  - User-Agent
- Used **ua-parser-js** library for analyzing User-Agents:  
<https://github.com/faisalman/ua-parser-js>



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## WINDOW SIZE ANALYSIS

### SCREEN SIZES

```
"wInnerHeight": 1200,  
"wInnerWidth": 1600,  
"wOuterHeight": 1200,  
"wOuterWidth": 1600,
```

- Possible only while browser is in fullscreen mode
- Unlikely anyone would be opening a phishing link while in fullscreen mode



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## WINDOW SIZE ANALYSIS

### OUTER WINDOW SMALLER THAN INNER WINDOW

```
"wDevicePixelRatio": 1,  
"wInnerHeight": 768,  
"wInnerWidth": 1024,  
"wOuterHeight": 600,  
"wOuterWidth": 800,
```

- Possible only when zoomed out (Control+'-')
- This should be reflected with **wDevicePixelRatio < 1**, but never is
- Unlikely anyone would be zoomed out when opening a new link



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## WINDOW SIZE ANALYSIS

### UNREALISTIC WINDOW SIZES

```
"wDevicePixelRatio": 1,  
"wInnerHeight": 768,  
"wInnerWidth": 1366,  
"wOuterHeight": 1,  
"wOuterWidth": 1,
```

- Outer window unnaturally small





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## BROWSER VERSION ANALYSIS

### OUTDATED VERSIONS

```
"browser": {  
  "major": "100",  
  "name": "Chrome",  
  "version": "100.0.4896.127"  
}
```

- Almost every single bot used a browser version older than 6 months



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## INTERESTING CASES

### SAFARI ON IPHONE

```
"browser": {  
  "major": "17",  
  "name": "Mobile Safari",  
  "version": "17.4"  
}
```

### WINDOW DIMENSIONS LOOKING GOOD

```
"wDevicePixelRatio": 3,  
"wInnerHeight": 664,  
"wInnerWidth": 390,  
"wOuterHeight": 664,  
"wOuterWidth": 390,
```



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## INTERESTING CASES

### VIDEO CARD (?!)

```
"videoCard": [  
  "Google Inc. (Google)",  
  "ANGLE (Google, Vulkan 1.3.0 (SwiftShader Device (Subzero)  
(0x0000C0DE)), SwiftShader driver)"  
]
```

**JA4: 8daaf6152771** (Google Chrome)

**Safari - really?!**

**The real detection power comes from cross-checking  
the data from all the sensors**



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## EVILGINX PRO BOTGUARD

```
min_ver: '4.0.0'
ja4:
  # if 'allow' is defined, whitelist mode is activated
  allow:
  deny:
    - {b: 'e8f1e7e78f70'}
    - {b: '9dc949149365'} # golang
    - {b: 'cbb2034c60b8'} # golang 1.22
    - {b: 'c7886603b240'} # Python requests 3.10
    - {b: '730fb1b0ac6a'} # Python requests 2.27
    - {b: 'e8a523a41297'} # Googlebot
    - {b: '1ce71f0edbb1'} # Java 8.0
    - {b: '231e334592e8'} # bingbot
    - {b: '2b729b4bf6f3'} # bingbot
    - {b: '76e208dd3e22'} # curl
user_agent:
  # if 'allow' is defined, whitelist mode is activated
  allow:
    - {browser: 'Chrome', version: '>= 120'}
    - {browser: 'Firefox', version: '>= 120.0'}
    - {browser: 'Edge', version: '>= 120.0'}
    - {browser: 'Opera', version: '>= 120.0'}
    - {browser: 'Safari', version: '>= 16.0'}
  deny:
    - {browser: 'Headless'}
```



**BREAKDEV**



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# evilginxpro

**COMING SOON**  
(2024)



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# THANK YOU

Questions?



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